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The current trends in the capital/labor split and the impacts thereof on the growth of 
inequality are one of the main concerns of national governments, European Commission 
and international organizations like UN, ILO, IMF, OECD and WB. These trends are usually 
studied at the macro level of functional distribution of income, that is, among capital and 
labor, and less with regard to productivity, remuneration policies or some other particular 
factors. In this paper, we contribute to the studies of the second type, explaining the 
decreasing labor income share in terms of unpaid working time and underpaid hourly 
earnings. For this purpose, we refer to the decreasing labor–labor exchange rate, i.e. 
devaluation of one’s labor in exchange for other’s labor embodied in the commodities 
affordable for one’s earnings. We show that the productivity growth allows employers to 
compensate workers with always a lower labor equivalent, i.e. increasingly underpay 
works, maintaining however an impression of fair pay due to an increasing purchasing 
power of earnings. This conclusion is based on the OECD 1990–2014 data for G7 countries 
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) and Denmark 
(known for the world least inequality). Then statistically significant implications for the 
growth of inequality are derived and some policy suggestions are formulated like taxing the 
enterprises with the inner Gini that surpasses the national level.  
Keywords: Inequality, productivity, hourly earnings, consumer prices, housing prices, 
labor–labor exchange rate 
JEL classification: D31—Personal Income and Wealth Distribution; D63—Equity, Justice, 
Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; E31—Price Level, Inflation, 
Deflation; E64—Incomes Policy; Price Policy; J24— Human Capital, Skills, Occupational 
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Inequality has been studied for over 250 years. The founders of the modern political 
economy, Adam Smith (1723–1790) and David Ricardo (1772–1823), discussed the 
functional distribution of income, that is, between the classes of landlords, capital owners 
and laborers, whose incomes were rent, profits and wages, respectively. Ricardo even calls 
this question “the principal problem of political economy” [Ricardo, 1817, Preface]. 
However, until recently “the field has at times led a somewhat modest existence on the 
outskirts of mainstream academic research. One of the reasons for this may have been that 
the study of income distribution is so tied up with normative issues of equity and justice 
that many economists, keen to pursue a value-free version of their subject, have tended to 
shy away from it” [Sandmo 2015, p. 5]. Another reason was that “labour shares have long 
been considered stable and therefore attracted little attention from research and policy 
discussion” [ILO and OECD 2015, p. 2]; indeed, see [Curtis 1962, Wallis 1960]. For a 
comprehensive survey of that time see [Asimakopulos 1987]. 
In the last decade, the trends in the capital/labor split and the impacts thereof on the 
growth of inequality became one of the main concerns of national governments, European 
Commission and international organizations [United States Department of Labor 2015; 
European Commission 2007–2016; United Nations 2015; United Nations Development 
Program 2016; Hoffer and Spiecker 2011; ILO 2011, 2013, 2015; ILO and OECD 2015; ILO 
IMF OECD and WB 2015]. On the other hand, the vast overviews of the history and theory of 
wealth distribution [Atkinson and Bourguignon 2000, 2015; Goldfarb and Leonard 2005; 
Jenkin 2011; Moscati 2012; Salverda et al 2009] and the monograph [Piketty 2013] have 
once again made inequality a mainstream topic in economics. One of the theses is that the 
historical accumulation of capital enhances its contribution to general productivity, in 
particular through investments in research and development. This implies an increasing 
role of capital owners and managers, explaining the disproportional increase in their 
income. On the other hand, the marginal productivity of capital decreases as its stock 
increases, in other words: “too much capital kills the return on capital” [Piketty 2013, p. 
215]. Hence, to maintain a constant return on capital in a developing competitive economy, 
its income share must grow.1 Thus the increasing inequality is justified economically, even 
if indirectly; at the same time, there are serious concerns about the social and political 
consequences [OECD 2008, 2011, 2015a; United Nations 2015, goal 10]. 
In this paper, we call into question the fairness of the current trends in the capital/labor 
split. For this purpose, we avoid abstract notions and conduct our analysis in the more 
intelligible terms of unpaid working time and underpaid hourly earnings. We compare 
                                                        
1 This conclusion is shared by most scholars, also by critics of Piketty’s book like [Acemogul and Robinson 
2015] who, regarding income distribution, defend the decisive role of political and economic institutions as 
opposed to the `general laws of capitalism’.   
8 
 
actual wages to fair wages with respect to growing productivity2 and we monitor their 
dynamics using 1990–2014 statistics for the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom and United States) and Denmark (known for having the lowest 
inequality worldwide). We then derive implications for the growth of inequality and 
formulate some policy suggestions. We begin by recounting several theoretical 
advancements in the field.  
Adam Smith is probably the first great economist who considered wages in the context of 
technical progress. He illustrates his train of thought through the example of a pin factory 
with ten workers, whose individual productivity is several hundred times higher than that 
of an artisan who performs all the operations himself [Smith 1776, Chapter 1]. However, 
there is no corresponding difference in their incomes. According to Smith, better pay in one 
industry would gradually spread across all industries due to competitive labor mobility. 
The improved living conditions would stimulate the working population to grow and the 
resulting excessive labor supply would then reverse the initial wage increase. Thereby, 
Smith prepares the ground for the theory of population by Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), 
who promotes subsistence wages to prevent a demographic boom, guaranteeing 
nevertheless the reproduction of labor [Malthus 1798].3 
The demographic boom is also Ricardo’s main concern. He notices that rent is determined 
by the output from the best rent-free land (in modern terminology, the margin of 
production), where laborers can move to if the rent is too high. Wages are therefore 
determined by the potential of marginal land rather than by labor productivity, because 
excessive production is appropriated by landlords through rent. As the population grows, 
land becomes scarce, implying a steady increase of land prices and, correspondingly, the 
landowners’ share of national income.4 The same is true for capital owners who have the 
monopoly for the means of production. However, the favorite example of the classical 
economists, the United States, shows that a developing economy, as well as territorial 
expansions, cause increases in labor demand and exert an upward pressure on wages. The 
conclusion is that high wages are caused by economic growth rather than by the country’s 
wealth. If the economy stagnates, then the wages return to the subsistence level, which 
Ricardo called the “natural price of labor” [Ricardo 1817/1821, Chapter 5].5 
This conclusion, assuming homogeneous labor, does not however explain wage differentials 
across professions. Adam Smith enumerates their causes:  
                                                        
2 The gap between wages and productivity is mentioned in [ILO et al 2015:14–15]: “Income inequality can 
arise from numerous sources within the labour market, but five of them are particularly relevant, notably (i) 
the gap between wages and productivity; (ii) employment levels; (iii) changing patterns of employment 
relationships; (iv) a weakening of labour market institutions; and (v) increasing wage dispersion”. This gap is 
discussed in a number of papers, see for instance [Bivens and Mishel 2015, Van Reenen and Pessoa 2012]. 
3 The modern concept of minimum wage is a kind of tribute to the historical notion of subsistence wage 
[Minimum wage 2016]. 
4 Now, this trend manifests itself in big-city housing prices. They are only constrained by lower housing prices 
in suburbs + transportation expenses + inconveniences and options farther afield in the countryside. 
5 The concept, promoted worldwide, of “sustained development” [United Nations 2015] stems from this root. 
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…first, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves; 
secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of learning them; 
thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them; fourthly, the small or 
great trust which must be reposed in those who exercise them; and, fifthly, the 
probability or improbability of success in them [Smith 1776, Chapter 10]. 
For instance, becoming a successful lawyer is difficult, expensive and dependent on 
auspicious circumstances. Anticipating the idea of human capital as introduced by [Mincer 
1958, Becker 1964], Smith draws an analogy between investments in professional training 
and in industrial equipment: 
… the wages of labour vary with the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and 
expense of learning the business. When any expensive machine is erected, the 
extraordinary work to be performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, 
will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man 
educated at the expense of much labour and time to any of those employments 
which require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those 
expensive machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over 
and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense 
of his education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. It 
must do this, too, in a reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain 
duration of human life, in the same manner as to the more certain duration of the 
machine [Smith 1776, Chapter 10]. 
As noted by [Sandmo 2013, p. 13], the Smith–Malthus–Ricardo subsistence wage theory 
somewhat contradicts the existing wage differentials. Indeed, if the subsistence wage is 
assumed to be the average wage, then some professions are always rewarded higher and 
some lower. Hence, the lower wages provide no subsistence level, so it makes little sense to 
take these employments. On the other hand, if the subsistence wage is a minimum wage, 
then the average wage is above the minimum level, which contradicts to the long run trend 
toward the subsistence wage. 
Smith’s explanation of wage differentials based on the idea of fair pay is called into question 
by John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). He finds that Smith is not realistic regarding the 
competitive role of the “ease and hardship”. It ignores the selfish interests of landlords and 
capital owners who, as in the case of Ricardian rent, exploit the social weakness of laborers 
to their own advantage. Mill writes that the hardship and the earnings often stand in 
inverse relationship to each other: 
The really exhausting and the really repulsive labours, instead of being better paid 
than others, are almost invariably paid the worst of all, because performed by those 
who have no choice. …The more revolting the occupation, the more certain it is to 
receive the minimum of remuneration, because it devolves on the most helpless and 
degraded, on those who from squalid poverty, or from want of skill and education, 
are rejected from all other employments [Mill 1848, Book II, Ch. 4].  
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Elaborating Mills’s idea, John Elliot Cairnes (1823–1875) coins the notion of “non-
competing groups” to characterize the individuals of the lower classes whose poor 
education prevents them finding a well-paid and enjoyable employment. Here, the 
inequality of opportunity implies wage differentials, the inequality of net advantages and 
higher exposure to unemployment risks [Cairnes 1874].6  
In contrast to the current promotion of full employment [European Commission 2010b], 
Karl Marx (1818–1883) asserts that unemployment is in the interest of capitalists. An 
excessive labor supply allows them to draw on the “industrial reserve army” for low wages 
even during development and expansion periods, guaranteeing high returns from capital. 
Marx argues that labor is the fundamental factor of production, because when “regarded as 
exchange-values all commodities are merely definite quantities of congealed labour-time” 
[Marx 1859, Part 1, italics original]. This means that profits result from exploitation—the 
difference between the value of production and subsistence wages, that is, from the unpaid 
fraction of working time. Following Mill’s logic, the more hopeless the workers’ despair, the 
easier their exploitation. Hence, inequality and poverty meet profound interests of the 
ruling class. Thus, regardless of growing productivity, income inequality will persist and 
even increase under capitalism [Marx 1868, Ch. 25, Sect. 3]. 
According to Thomas Piketty (1971–), “like his predecessors, Marx totally neglected the 
possibility of durable technological progress and steadily increasing productivity, which is a 
force that can go to some extent serve as a counterweight to the process of accumulation 
and concentration of capital.” In fact, due to the Industrial Revolution, “in the last third of 
the nineteenth century, wages finally began to increase: the purchasing power of workers 
spread everywhere, and this changed the situation radically, even if extreme inequalities 
persisted and in some respects continued to increase until World War I.” Two World Wars 
and the Great Depression between them moderated inequality. The “thirty glorious years” 
from 1945 to 1975 are marked by a rapid economic development, and, following Ricardo’s 
conclusions, no significant growth of inequality in industrialized countries is observed. The 
philosophy “Growth is a rising tide that lifts all boats” is reflected in Simon Kuznetz’ (1901–
1985) theory of automatic decrease in inequality in advanced capitalism [Kuznetz 1953, 
1955]. This perspective is often illustrated using the bell-shaped “Kuznets curve” of 
inequality, which first rises and then falls along the development stages of a country. 
Similarly, [Solow 1956] promises a `balanced growth path, that is, a growth trajectory along 
which all variables—output, incomes, profits, wages, capital, asset prices, and so on—would 
progress at the same pace, so that every social group would benefit from growth to the 
same degree, with no major deviations from the norm’ [Piketty 2013, p. 9–11]. However, 
the wave of enthusiasm sparked by Kuznets' theory was perhaps premature: 
                                                        
6 All of these resemble the current discussion about traps of precarious employment in weak social groups. 
Insufficient skills are regarded as one of main causes of low incomes and of mass unemployment [European 
Commission 2010–2016, OECD 2015b]. 
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The data Kuznets had presented in his 1953 book suddenly became a powerful 
political weapon. He was well aware of the highly speculative nature of his 
theorizing. Nevertheless, by presenting such an optimistic theory in the context of a 
"presidential address" to the main professional association of US economists, an 
audience that was inclined to believe and disseminate the good news delivered by 
their prestigious leader, he knew that he would wield considerable influence: thus 
the "Kuznets curve" was born. In order to make sure that everyone understood what 
was at stake, he took care to remind his listeners that the intent of his optimistic 
predictions was quite simply to maintain the underdeveloped countries "within the 
orbit of the free world." In large part, then, the theory of the Kuznets curve was a 
product of the Cold War [Piketty 2013, p.14].  
The stability of the share of income accruing to labor  
…has disciplined myriad models over the past half-century. The requirement that 
the labor share be constant in theoretical models has shaped many economists' 
intuitions regarding the aggregate production function, economic growth, and 
inequality. At odds with this background, the labor share of income has exhibited a 
pervasive global decline since the early 1980s. …Our main empirical finding is that 
both gross and net labor shares have in general declined around the world over the 
past four decades. Some countries, including the United States, experienced 
increases in the value of depreciation as a share of gross domestic product. As a 
result, these countries experienced smaller declines in their net labor share relative 
to their gross labor share. However, the average economy in the world experienced a 
decline of similar magnitude in both measures. Further, the cross-country pattern of 
declines in the net labor share closely resembles the cross-country pattern of 
declines in the gross labor share [Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014c]. 
As we now know, the “sustained development” [United Nations 2015] promoted so heavily 
around the world seems to be insufficient to constrain inequality: 
It is now widely accepted that the rise observed in the wage share in Europe in the 
1970s can be largely related to either aggressive wage bidding and/or strong 
resistance by workers to adjust their wages so as to bear the cost of higher oil prices, 
tax wedges and lower productivity growth. Moreover, this phenomenon was more 
pronounced in countries where labour market institutions allowed for tougher wage 
bargaining by workers’ unions (in some countries the problem was exacerbated by 
the introduction of uniform minimum wages) [de Serres, Scarpetta, de la 
Maisonneuve 2002].7  
                                                        
7 Some ILO economists also find “aggressive wage bidding” harmful, even in the background of growing 
inequality:  
With the euro, balanced trade requires that wages in all member states grow in line with national 
productivity plus targeted inflation rate of the ECB. Otherwise countries with relative higher growth in unit 
labour costs will systematically lose market share and build up trade deficits. The case for a coordinated 
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No less important during the post-World-War-II years were the policies of left-social 
democrats. They were adopted not least due to the impressive industrial, military and social 
advancements of the USSR. After the collapse of communism by 1990, this systemic 
alternative to capitalism was removed from the political agenda. The world shifted to the 
right and inequality sharply increased. However, the rise of inequality under globalization 
is doubly bad, because all the world wealth may end up concentrated in just a few hands, 
destabilizing entire societies both economically and politically: 
It would be a serious mistake to neglect the importance of the [Ricardian] scarcity 
principle for understanding the global distribution of wealth in the twenty-first 
century. To convince oneself of this, it is enough to replace the price of farmland in 
Ricardo's model by the price of urban real estate in major world capitals, or, 
alternatively, by the price of oil. In both cases, if the trend over the period 1970–
2010 is extrapolated to the period 2010–2050 or 2010–2100, the result is economic, 
social, and political disequilibria of considerable magnitude, not only between but 
within countries—disequilibria that inevitably call to mind the Ricardian apocalypse. 
To be sure, there exists in principle a quite simple economic mechanism that should 
restore equilibrium to the process: the mechanism of supply and demand. If the 
supply of any good is insufficient, and its price is too high, then demand for that good 
should decrease, which should lead to a decline in its price. In other words, if real 
estate and oil prices rise, then people should move to the country or take to traveling 
about by bicycle (or both). Never mind that such adjustments might be unpleasant or 
complicated; they might also take decades, during which landlords and oil well 
owners might well accumulate claims on the rest of the population so extensive that 
they could easily come to own everything that can be owned, including rural real 
estate and bicycles, once and for all. As always, the worst is never certain to arrive. It 
is much too soon to warn readers that by 2050 they may be paying rent to the emir 
of Qatar [Piketty 2013, p. 6–7]. 
Even before it comes to paying rent to the emir of Qatar, societies can be significantly 
destabilized on their own. The fact that the rich are becoming more rich much more rapidly 
than lower classes improve their standing is clearly illustrated by Paul Krugman (1953–) 
using the example of the United States: 
Even households at the 95th percentile — that is, households richer than 19 out of 20 
Americans — have seen their real income rise less than 1 percent a year since the 
late 1970s. But the income of the richest 1 percent has roughly doubled, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
wage policy to avoid imbalances, beggar thy neighbour policies and a waste of potential growth is 
overwhelming; it is alarming that it has been ignored for so long. Those who let unit labour costs rise too 
fast are equally responsible for the explosion of imbalances after the abolition of the exchange rate 
mechanism as those who gained market shares through wage restraint. This lack of policy coordination 
resulted in rapidly growing trade imbalances after 1998 [Hoffer and Spiecker 2011].  
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income of the top 0.01 percent — people with incomes of more than $5 million in 
2004 — has risen by a factor of 5 [Krugman  2006].8 
Responding to the challenges of the 21st century, the capital/labor income shares and their 
impact on income distribution are extensively studied by international organizations and 
academic institutions [Adler and Schmid 2013; Arpaia et al 2009; Atkinson 2009; Atkinson 
et al. 2011; Baccaro and Pontusson 2015; Checchi and Garcìa-Penalosa 2010; Glyn 2009;  
Karabarbounis and Neiman 2012–2014c; Mulas-Granados and Francese 2015; OECD 2008, 
2011, 2015; ILO 2013; Schlenker and Schmid 2013; Stockhammer 2013]. These works 
confirm the impact of changes in capital/labor income shares on the growth of inequality 
and acknowledge the ongoing commodification of labor in the sense of [Polanyi 1944].  
The analysis of functional distribution of income reveals the growing capital share which is 
often justified by investments in research and development to increase productivity. The 
latter could mean that the job of the many is done by much fewer better paid workers, so 
that the gains are fairly distributed among capital and labor, though with an increasing 
capital share. Or, the total number of workers remains approximately the same and the 
extra gains are appropriated almost exclusively by capital owners. The analysis of 
functional distribution of income makes no distinction here. 
It should be noted that labor force is not declining but growing [OECD.Stat 2017], and the 
European Commission promotes its further increase [European Commission 2010a]. At the 
same time, labor develops in parallel with technology. Workers are becoming better 
educated and more advanced technically. They operate expensive, sophisticated equipment 
and bear responsibility for its safety. As a result, labor is progressively becoming more 
efficient. The increasing role of skilled labor is reflected in its promotion in terms of “human 
capital” and “human development”, emphasizing its importance compared with that of 
industrial and financial capital [World Economic Forum 2015, United Nations Development 
Programme 2016]. This accumulation of human capital is not less important than the 
accumulation of financial and industrial capitals. Therefore, the explanation of increasing 
capital income share by the accumulation of capital can hardly be justified — even 
economically. Taking into account that the recent advances in labor, its decreasing share 
can mean that fair pay is gradually reduced to a modern kind of subsistence wages, turning 
back the pages of time. Let us illustrate this process with two personal observations.  
Decreasing labor–labor exchange rate. My car service station, which asks not to be 
identified, charges clients 50 EUR for an hour of work, of which a worker receives 25 
EUR. If the worker decided to have his car repaired at his own place of employment, 
he would pay twice his earnings for the same work. In other words, the return on his 
own labor expressed in the equivalent labor of others is 50%, resulting in a labor–
labor exchange rate (LLER) of 50%. Twenty years ago the service station charged the 
clients 50 DM/hour (ca. 25 EUR) while paying its workers 30 DM/hour (ca. 15 EUR), 
resulting in a return on labor of 60%. Thus, twenty years ago a labor unit was 
                                                        
8 For an analytic treatment of this subject see, for instance, [Mishel Gould and Bivens 2015].  
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exchanged for 0.6 labor units, whereas now it is worth only 0.5 units. Thus, the LLER 
has decreased by 1/6, or ca. 17%. The capital income share has increased 
correspondingly. 
The falling purchasing power of earnings in labor units is not that apparent when 
considering consumer goods. Thanks to technological advancements, their 
production has gotten cheaper. This improves the purchasing power of earnings in 
consumer units (but not in labor units), outbalancing the LLER decrease. For 
instance, in the 1980s the price of a simple personal computer was as high as an 
average monthly salary. Now an average salary suffices for three much better 
computers, giving the impression of a significant increase in the value of earnings. 
However, the amount of labor invested in old versus modern PCs differs by much 
more than three times, meaning that the average salary’s purchasing power in labor 
units has decreased. All of these result in delusory wealth for the workers and real 
profits for the computer industry.  
Decreasing labor–labor exchange rate in terms of housing. As expressed in a personal 
communication in August 2015 by Marc Lepeltier, a real estate agent in Cambremer, 
French Normandy, the rich are now acquiring the properties of the middle class; the 
middle class are purchasing working-class housing; and the working class, unable to 
afford their own homes, must content themselves with rented accommodations. And 
the luxury villas of the rich are attainable exclusively by the superrich, mostly 
foreigners. Or, to put it differently, the houses purchased 40 years ago by middle-
class families with one earner are now affordable only for middle-class families with 
two earners. It should be noted that, due to the relative lack of automation, the 
amount of labor embodied in construction remains almost invariable. If the LLER 
remained constant, the housing prices would rise in proportion to earnings. The 
falling purchasing power of earnings with respect to housing indicates a falling LLER 
exchange rate and a corresponding increase in rent and the share of construction 
capital.  
Based on these observations, we consider the circulation of labor by analogy with the 
circulation of money described by Marx as “M-C-M, the transformation of money into 
commodities, and the change of commodities back again into money; or buying in order to 
sell” [Marx 1867, Ch. 4]. Its dual labor analog is L–M–L, the transformation of one’s labor 
into money earned, and spending the money to pay for the labor embodied in the 
commodities purchased; or selling one’s own labor in order to buy others’ labor. Both 
formulas, M–C–M and L–M–L, explain what one gets; in both cases the return is expressed in 
the input units. Unlike the lucrative exchange M–C–M, the exchange L–M–L is unprofitable, 
because a fraction of the commodity values is appropriated by capital and real estate 
owners.9 The second distinction is that the input/output of M–C–M are expressed in easily 
                                                        
9 We do not consider the capital share as accumulated labor — in Marx’ terms “congealed labour-time” — 
because it is already appropriated by the capitalist or real estate owner. 
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countable money units, whereas those of L–M–L assume aggregate labor units that cannot 
be measured directly. Therefore, we do not consider the exchange L–M–L in absolute 
figures but estimate its dynamics relative to some reference year, i.e. index its exchange 
rate: LLER.  
To operationalize our approach, we express hourly earnings10 either in consumer units 
(reflecting LLER in the domain of industrial capital) or in housing units (reflecting LLER in 
the domain of real estate). This is done using the OECD indexes for hourly earnings, 
consumer prices and new housing prices. Following the philosophy “Growth is a rising tide 
that lifts all boats” we compute “fair” hourly earnings whose purchasing power grows in 
proportion to productivity. Taking into account the above quote from [de Serres, Scarpetta, 
de la Maisonneuve 2002] about “aggressive wage bidding” in the 1970s and the increase of 
capital share in the 1980s, we assume that capital–labor income shares came to a 
reasonable proportion during the decade ending with the fall of communism. Thus, we 
adopt the year 1990 as a reference for “fair pay”, or status quo.  
Monitoring the LLER country curves for a quarter century, 1990–2014, we find that German 
manufacturing workers in 2014 are paid 17% “less than they merit” with reference to 
consumer prices, and 28% less with reference to new housing prices. Among the eight 
countries considered, the worst situation is seen in the United States (33% and 37%, 
respectively) and the best in Denmark (–1% and 12%). The worse trends for the LLER with 
reference to housing prices align with the study on inadequate housing costs [Eurofound 
2016]. The correlation between the countries’ Gini coefficients and the declines in LLER is 
0.83, being statistically highly significant. This indicates the dependence between the 
decrease in LLER and the growth in inequality.  
Section “Productivity, earnings, consumer prices and housing prices” describes the 
interaction of the time series used in further analysis.  
In Section “Labor–labor exchange rate” the central notion of the paper is operationally 
defined, indexed and visualized based on statistics for the G7 countries and Denmark. 
Section “Interpreting labor–labor exchange rate in terms of pay” illustrates how to convert 
the labor–labor exchange rate indices into absolute figures — either in terms of unpaid 
working time or underpaid earnings.  
Section “Dependence between inequality and the LLER decrease” provides empirical 
evidence for significant statistical dependence between the degree of inequality and the 
degree to which the LLER decreases.  
In Section “Conclusions” the results of the paper are recapitulated and put into context. 
Finally, we explain that high taxation can retain the labor–labor exchange rate within 
reasonable bounds, thereby creating the preconditions to tackle the growth of inequality. 
Section “Appendix: Source data and visualization thereof” contains tables with the data 
used in the model and figures that illustrate the tables.  
                                                        
10 In manufacturing — the standard reference for earnings [OECD 2004, p. 8, 57, Note 5, ILO 2016, 5B]. 
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Productivity, earnings, consumer prices and housing prices 
To explain our way of thinking, let us consider four curves in Figure 1. They display the 
1990–2014 US indices of housing prices, hourly earnings in manufacturing, consumer 
prices and productivity. The earnings and two price indices are given for current money 
values, whereas the productivity index refers to `constant prices’, reflecting the inflation-
adjusted productivity. These US curves are extracted from Figures 5–7 and 9 in the 
Appendix, which are in turn derived from the indices (OECD.Stat 2015) given in Tables 5–8  
(also in the Appendix) and from the data (Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of 
Labor 2012) given in Table 9 (ditto). The conversion of the OECD indices 2010 = 100% to 
1990 = 100% is done by dividing each OECD index by its 1990 value and multiplying by 
100%.  
As one can see, the US hourly earnings and consumer prices (both in current prices) 
increase almost synchronically by a factor of 1.8, showing that in the last 25 years both 
earnings and consumer prices have almost doubled. The synchronous growth of both 
indices means that the purchasing power of hourly earning remains practically the same 
over the period considered. Consequently, the US manufacturing workers’ living standards 
have improved little during the last quarter century (if there is any improvement at all, then 
it is rather due to wealth accumulation than to income), which is in line with Krugman’s 
remark as cited in Introduction.  
The increase in productivity (inflation-free, i.e., real increase) by a factor of 1.5 in Figure 1 
would suggest a commensurable increase in the earnings’ purchasing power. The fact that 
no increase in purchasing power is observed means that the gains from productivity growth 
are not distributed among the workers but appropriated by capital owners and top 
managers, aggravating income inequality.11  
If productivity in construction were equal to that in manufacturing, the housing price index 
in Figure 1 would grow more or less synchronically with the more manufacturing-
dependent consumer price index. In actuality, the productivity in construction grows 
slower than in manufacturing, because the share of human labor in construction remains   
                                                        
11 This viewpoint is not that self-evident. Some prominent US economists moderate the related concerns: 
If wages rise at the same pace as productivity, labor’s share of national income remains essentially 
unchanged. This paper presents specific evidence that this has happened: the share of national 
income going to employees is at approximately the same level now as it was in 1970 [Feldstein 2008]. 
In recent years, labor’s share in income has fallen off a bit. (Between 2000 and 2005, employee 
compensation as a percentage of gross domestic income fell from 58.2 to 56.8 percent.) From the 
Cobb-Douglas perspective, this means that the marginal productivity of labor has fallen relative to 
average productivity. This modest drop in labor’s share is not well understood, but its importance 
should not be exaggerated [Mankiw 2006]; see also [Mankiw 2003]. 
It should be noted however that “within the labour share, the highest earners have captured an increasingly 






Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015): (1. Housing prices) Prices and Purchasing Power Parities > Consumer and 
Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: (a) consumer prices – 
housing, (b) consumer prices – housing excluding imputed rent; Time and frequency: annual; Measure: index; (2. Hourly earnings) 
Labour > Earnings > Hourly earnings (MEI) > Customize > Selection > Subject: manufacturing, index; Time and frequency: annual; 
(3. Consumer prices) Prices and Purchasing Power Parities > Consumer and Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > 
Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: consumer prices – all items; Time and frequency: annual; Measure: 
index; (4. Productivity) Productivity > Productivity and ULC – annual, total economy > Growth in GDP per capita, productivity and 
ULC > Customize > Subject: GDP per hour worked, constant prices; Measure: index. 
  
Figure 1: United States indices of productivity (solid line), hourly earnings in manufacturing 
(dashed line), housing prices (dotted line) and consumer prices (dash-dotted line); index 
1990 = 100%   
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rather constant, whereas in manufacturing it decreases due to rapidly developing robotics, 
automated production lines and computer-assisted design. To provide the same capital 
return in less productive construction, housing prices are disproportionally boosted. This is 
visualized in Figure 1. 
Labor–labor exchange rate (LLER) 
Now we operationalize the notion of labor–labor exchange rate using an example. Let us 
assume that in 1990 one worker makes four kettles per hour of work and his colleague 
makes four coffee pots. These production units require the same amount of labor and have 
the same retail price. Taking into account capital investments, social security contributions 
and other factors, we assume that the hourly earnings allow the worker who makes four 
kettles per hour to purchase two coffee pots, while another worker, who makes four coffee 
pots per hour, can purchase two kettles. In this situation, the labor embodied in four units is 
exchanged for the labor needed for two units. Thus, the labor–labor exchange rate is 2:1, 
which is regarded as a status quo. If the productivity doubles by 2014, that is, each worker 
makes eight units per hour instead of four and the labor–labor exchange rate remains the 
same at 2:1, then the real purchasing power of hourly earnings must double as well, i.e. 
each worker’s hourly earnings must suffice to purchase four units produced by his 
colleague. This situation is seen as maintaining the labor–labor exchange status quo, or fair. 
If in 2014 each worker’s hourly earnings means ha can afford not four but only three 
production units, the labor–labor exchange is now 8:3 = 2.67:1 — thus deteriorating the 
status quo and considered unfair.   
The labor–labor exchange rate from the above example can be naturally generalized to 
aggregate labor. We operationalize it using aggregate productivity and aggregate prices. 
The idea is that “abstract” labor units invested in production are remunerated with hourly 
earnings. The latter are used to purchase the labor units of others embodied in aggregate 
consumer goods. Productivity in constant prices (= real productivity), hourly earnings and 
consumer prices are statistically monitored with indices of relative change over time, so 
that we can trace the dynamics of the labor–labor exchange rate, without referring 
explicitly to money values — just “productivity” and “purchasing power”.  
To be more specific, let us come back to Figure 1. As already mentioned, a US productivity 
growth by a factor of 1.5 suggests a commensurable increase in the purchasing power of 
hourly earnings. The fact that the purchasing power with reference to consumer products 
has not changed over 25 years means that the labor–labor exchange rate (with reference to 
consumer products) actually decreased by a factor of 1.5. Generalizing this train of thought, 
we obtain the following index of labor–labor exchange rate (LLER) as a function of time t: 
LLER1990=1(𝑡) =
Hourly earnings in consumer units1990=100(𝑡)
Productivity1990=100(𝑡)
                                   (1) 
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The subscripts 1990 = 1 and 1990 = 100 mean that the indices refer to the status quo year 
1990, where the index values are 1 or 100%, respectively.  
Let us apply this formula to our example with kettles and coffee pots. Since the hourly 
earnings in consumer units increases from two units in 1990 to four in 2014, and the 
productivity doubles: 
Hourly earnings in consumer units1990=100(2014) 
Productivity1990=100(2014)
= 200% 
 = 200% .
 




= 1 . 
That is, the labor–labor exchange rate remains the same as in 1990, maintaining the status 
quo, and the hourly pay in 2014 is considered fair. If in 2014 the purchasing power of the 
workers’ hourly earnings increased from two to only three units instead of four, then we 
would have 
LLER1990=1(2014) =





= 0.75 .  
 
This means a decrease in the labor–labor exchange rate to 0.75 of its initial 1990 state, or a 
devaluation of one’s labor in the labor–labor exchange by 25% . This is regarded as unfair.  
The dynamics of hourly earnings in aggregate (conditional) consumer units can be 
expressed as the following index: 




Substituting this expression in (1), we finally obtain the index of labor–labor exchange rate 
with reference to consumer prices:  




     
Productivity1990=100(𝑡)
.         (2) 
This formula is applied to compute the curves in Figure 2 from the data in Tables 5, 7 and 8. 
These curves show the development of LLER w.r.t. consumer prices1990=100(𝑡) for the G7 
countries and Denmark. The trends in the labor–labor exchange rate of the five European 
states in Figure 2 are more favorable than that of the three non-European countries. The 
best situation is found in Denmark: in 2013 the labor–labor exchange rate returned to its 
initial 1990 value, even increasing in 2014. In Italy, United Kingdom and France one’s labor 
has devaluated by 5–8%, whereas in Germany it is down by 17%.  Japan and Canada, with 
their 23% and 24% labor devaluation, respectively, come next, and the greatest decline of 
the labor–labor exchange rate is observed in the United States, where one’s labor has lost 





Source: Derived from OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/  (26.11.2015): (1) Labour > Earnings > Hourly earnings (MEI) > Customize > 
Selection > Subject: manufacturing, index; Time and frequency: annual; (2) Prices and Purchasing Power Parities > Consumer and 
Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: consumer prices – all 
items; Time and frequency: annual, Measure: index; (3) Productivity > Productivity and ULC – Annual, Total Economy > Growth in 
GDP per capita, productivity and ULC > Customize > Subject: GDP per hour worked, constant prices; Measure: index. 
 





In addition to consumer units as an embodiment of labor, we refer to housing units 
measured, say, in square meters. Since the share of manual labor in construction remains 
relatively stable over time (strictly speaking, it decreases much slower than in 
manufacturing), square meters of housing can be regarded as embodiment of a more or less 
constant amount of labor — and construction, in turn, as a rather reliable reference for the 
labor–labor exchange. By analogy with the derivation of (2), we obtain 
LLER w.r.t. housing prices1990=100(𝑡) =
Hourly earnings in housing units 1990=100(𝑡)
Productivity1990=100(𝑡)
=  
    
Hourly earnings 1990=100(𝑡)
Housing prices1990=100(𝑡)
     
Productivity1990=100(𝑡)
 .                            (3)
 
Figure 3 displays the labor–labor exchange rate with reference to housing prices for the 
selection of countries and years as in Figure 2. The curves are computed from the data in 
Tables 6–8. Here, the trends look less favorable. Even in Denmark, one’s labor is devaluated 
by 12% and in the United States — by 37%. This means that construction units, with their 
rather constant share of manual labor, highlight a more dramatic violation of the status quo 






Source: Derived from OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015): (1) Labour > Earnings > Hourly earnings (MEI) > Customize > 
Selection > Subject: manufacturing, index; Time and frequency: annual (2) Prices and Purchasing Power Parities > Consumer and 
Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: (a) Consumer prices – 
housing, (b) Consumer prices – housing excluding imputed rent; Time and frequency: annual; Measure: index; (3) Productivity > 
Productivity and ULC – Annual, Total Economy > Growth in GDP per capita, productivity and ULC > Customize > Subject: GDP per 
hour worked, constant prices; Measure: index. 
 




Interpreting the labor–labor exchange rate in terms of pay 
A decreasing LLER means that an increasing fraction of working time is not compensated 
for by the labor of others. This may have a number of causes, for instance, increasing 
employers’ social security contributions, new tax burdens, rising energy prices, and, not 
least, attributing productivity gains to capital by rewarding its owners and managers more 
generously. Anyway, if we isolate the LLER from other factors, we can speak of a deficit in 
reciprocal labor compensation measured in working time, which we simply call a “unpaid 
percentage of working time”. As before, the “fair”, i.e. full, compensation (100% of working 
time) is associated with the 1990 status quo. 
In our context, the unpaid percentage of working time is the decrease in the LLER 
expressed in percent. Since we use two types of references for the LLER, we compute the 
unpaid percentage of working time in two versions: 
Non-paid percentage of working time(𝑡) =  {
[1–LLER with reference to consumer prices1990=1(𝑡)]  × 100%
[1–LLER with reference to housing prices1990=1(𝑡)]  × 100%
 
The results for selected years are shown in Table 1. The full time series are depicted in 
Figures 10–11 in the Appendix. As seen from Table 1, the most favorable situation is in 
Denmark (–1%, 12% in 2014), and the least favorable is found in the United States (33%, 
37% in 2014).  
 
Table 1: Unpaid percentage of working time, assuming full pay (100% of working time) in 1990 
(visualized in Figures 2–3) 
Country Labor–labor exchange reference 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Canada with reference to consumer prices 0   3 11 16 20 24 
 with reference to housing prices 0 –1   2   7 16 18 
France with reference to consumer prices 0   7   9 10   8   8 
 with reference to housing prices 0 14 16 20 22 23 
Germany with reference to consumer prices 0   6 10 15 17 17 
 with reference to housing prices 0 21 26 29 29 28 
Italy with reference to consumer prices 0   9 13 13   7   4 
 with reference to housing prices 0 15 25 25 23 20 
Japan with reference to consumer prices 0   7 13 15 22 23 
 with reference to housing prices 0 13 20 24 29 28 
United Kingdom with reference to consumer prices 0   5   2   1   2   5 
 with reference to housing prices 0 19 24 28 29 30 
United States with reference to consumer prices 0   8 16 24 29 33 
 with reference to housing prices 0   9 20 29 34 37 
Denmark with reference to consumer prices 0   6   5   3 –1 –1 
 with reference to housing prices 0 11 10 10 9 12 




We also compute “fair” hourly earnings, i.e. those that retain the same LLER as in the 
reference year 1990, and compare them with the existing ones. For this purpose, we take 
the 2011 hourly earnings in manufacturing expressed in EUR from Table 9, convert the 
hourly earnings indices 2010 = 100 in Table 8 into indices 1 = 2011 (by dividing them by 
their 2011 values), and with these new indices we calculate the actual hourly earnings. 
Taking into account the percentage of unpaid working time (for selected years, they are 
given in Table 1), we get the fair hourly earnings, that is, with the 1990 status quo in the 
labor–labor exchange. Figures 4–5 visualize both actual and fair hourly earnings in two 
versions, and Table 2 provides the comparison of actual and fair pay in selected years. 
Table 2: The actual hourly earnings in manufacturing and fair hourly earnings understood as having 
the same labor–labor exchange rate as in 1990 (visualized in Figures 10–11) 
Country Pay pattern 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Canada Actual pay 12.35 14.47 15.92 17.88 19.07 20.40 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 12.35 14.96 17.92 21.27 23.93 26.96 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 12.35 14.31 16.24 19.26 22.69 24.99 
France Actual pay   9.29 10.67 12.34 14.43 16.36 17.80 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices   9.29 11.47 13.55 16.00 17.76 19.32 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices   9.29 12.43 14.75 18.04 21.11 23.25 
Germany Actual pay 12.31 15.55 17.53 19.12 20.87 23.18 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 12.31 16.62 19.46 22.57 25.26 27.93 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 12.31 19.70 23.62 26.81 29.55 32.30 
Italy Actual pay   7.89 10.17 11.65 13.22 15.41 16.90 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices   7.89 11.22 13.32 15.12 16.50 17.70 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices   7.89 11.90 15.54 17.71 20.01 21.13 
Japan Actual pay 13.07 14.43 15.19 15.76 15.3 15.77 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 13.07 15.52 17.44 18.60 19.58 20.56 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 13.07 16.51 18.94 20.60 21.65 21.90 
United Kingdom Actual pay   7.21 9.52 11.78 14.26 16.74 18.04 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices   7.21 9.99 12.04 14.46 17.08 19.09 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices   7.21 11.72 15.59 19.83 23.63 25.80 
United States Actual pay 10.42 11.93 13.86 16.02 18.00 18.91 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 10.42 12.93 16.42 21.12 25.50 28.25 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 10.42 13.13 17.24 22.68 27.18 30.20 
Denmark Actual pay 14.45 17.08 20.75 25.06 29.55 31.68 
 Fair pay with reference to consumer prices 14.45 18.25 21.82 25.76 29.38 31.51 
 Fair pay with reference to housing prices 14.45 19.15 22.97 27.93 32.48 35.91 
Source: Author’s computations based on the variables previously defined and the 2011 hourly earnings in manufacturing in USD as 
given in (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 19.12.2012) International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation 
Costs in Manufacturing, 2011, p. 10, Table 3, last column http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf; converted with the USD--
EUR rate 0.77220 on 31.12.2011 (OANDA 2015) http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. 
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Dependence between inequality and the decrease in LLER 
Figure 4, which visualizes the data from Tables 10a–b in the Appendix, illustrates the 
growing inequality in the G7 countries and Denmark. It depicts the curves of the Gini 
coefficients for the distributions of income pre and post taxes and transfers. The data are 
available up to 2012, at which point six countries have very close Gini coefficients for the 
distributions of income before taxes. Different tax and social policy in these countries 
reduce the inequality to different extents.  
Table 3 shows the dependence between inequality and the decrease in LLER 1990–2014 by 
means of correlation between five variables, each with eight observations (for eight 
countries). The inequality is represented by two variables: (1) Gini coefficients for market 
income before taxes and transfers and (2) Gini coefficients for disposable income post taxes 
and transfers. We take the latest available data in Tables 10a–b.  
The increase in productivity in 2014 compared with 1990 is computed from the data in 
Table 7. These increases for eight countries correspond to the right-hand ends of the curves 
in Figure 7. For instance, for the USA this factor is 1.5, and for Denmark it is 1.35.   
The countries’ decreases in LLER with reference to either consumer or housing prices are 
replaced by the equivalent derivatives “Unpaid percentage of working time assuming full 
pay in 1990” with the same two references. Both of these variables are taken from the last 
column of Table 1. 
The third column of Table 3 shows that both Gini variables are weakly correlated with 
productivity growth. This means that, though investments in productivity are expected to 
increase the capital’s share in gains, the productivity alone has a low impact on inequality. 
Rather, inequality results from unfair remuneration of labor—this follows from the high 
correlation of the Gini variables with “Unpaid percentage of working time” (columns 4–5).  
The correlation with the LLER is higher for “Gini for disposable income post taxes and 
transfers”. As seen from Figure 4, taxes and transfers reduce income inequality in the eight 
countries to different degrees (six countries have almost the same Gini before taxes). As 
indirectly follows from Table 3, the higher the taxes, the smaller the decrease in LLER. 
Probably, high taxes reduce the purchasing power of earnings, constraining solvent 
demand. When this is exacerbated by unfair pay, demand is reduced further with negative 
consequences for sales. Roughly speaking, high taxes reduce stimuli to significantly increase 
the capital’s share in gains, even in the case of investments. On the other hand, high taxes 
enable generous social security transfers to weak population groups, increasing solvent 
demand and stimulating economic development. Thereby, high taxes contribute to 
maintaining a fair LLER and reduce the growth of inequality. All of these are easily visible in 






Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Social protection and well-being > Income distribution and 
poverty > Customize > Selection >  Age group: total population; Definition: current definition; Methodology: income 
definition until 2011; Measure: (a) Gini (market income, before taxes and transfers), (b) Gini (disposable income, post 
taxes and transfers) 
 
Figure 4: Gini coefficients for market income before taxes and transfers (dashed lines) and 






















Unpaid % of 
working time in 
2014 w.r.t. 
consumer prices 
assuming full pay 
in 1990 
Unpaid % of 
working time 
in 2014 w.r.t. 
housing prices 
assuming full 
pay in 1990 
Actual Gini market income 
before taxes 1 0.555 0.183 0.021 0.718** 
Actual Gini post taxes and 
transfers 0.555 1 0.347 0.660* 0.831*** 
Growth of general 
productivity in 1990–
2014 0.183 0.347 1 0.497 0.659* 
Unpaid % of working time 
in 2014 w.r.t. consumer 
prices assuming full pay in 
1990 0.021 0.660* 0.497 1 0.626* 
Unpaid % of working time 
in 2014 w.r.t. housing 
prices assuming full pay in 
1990 
0.718*
* 0.831*** 0.659* 0.626* 1 
***           PVAL ≤ 0.01 
**  0.01 < PVAL ≤ 0.05 




Goal of the paper. We have analyzed current trends in the capital/labor split and its 
impact on inequality growth in the more intelligible terms of unpaid working time 
and underpaid hourly earnings. “Looking inside” the split, we see that a higher 
productivity due to accumulation of capital and its investments in research and 
development, implying fewer workers for the same job, does not imply that these 
fewer workers are better remunerated. Instead, the gains are appropriated by the 
capital owners and its managers— contrary to the idea of proportional returns on 
the accumulation of human capital.  
Notion of labor–labor exchange rate (LLER). For analytical purposes, we introduce the 
notion of labor–labor exchange rate, i.e. the return on one’s labor in the form of the 
labor of others embodied in goods and services affordable for one’s earnings. As 
references, we use the aggregate labor embodied in consumer products and in 
housing. 
Decrease of the LLER. Using statistical data for the G7 countries and Denmark, we provide 
empirical evidence for a general devaluation of one’s own labor in the labor–labor 
exchange.  
Dependence between the degree of inequality and the degree of decline of LLER. The 
dependence between the degree of inequality and the degree of labor devaluation is 
statistically highly significant. It is no accident that the smallest LLER decrease is 
seen in Denmark with its lowest inequality, and the greatest is found in the United 
States, where the inequality is the highest of the eight countries considered. 
Controlling LLER decrease using common taxes. Under high taxes, the purchasing power 
of earnings is reduced, constraining solvent demand. When it is multiplied by unfair 
pay, demand is reduced further with negative consequences for sales. Roughly 
speaking, high taxes reduce stimuli to significantly increase the capital’s share in 
gains, even in the case of investments. On the other hand, high taxes enable generous 
social security transfers to weak population groups, increasing solvent demand and 
stimulating economic development. Thereby, high taxes contribute to maintaining a 
fair LLER and reduce the growth of inequality.  
Other policy incentives and inequality tax. To keep the LLER at some reasonable level, 
enterprises could receive tax exemptions or other privileges for keeping the inter-
enterprise Gini index below the national level. If high inequality may be likened to 
“social pollution”, then exceeding the national level could be penalized by an 





Appendix: Source data and visualization thereof 
Table 5: Consumer price indices 2010 = 100% (visualized in Figure 5) 
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 67.3 71.2 67.5 55.8 94.5 62.4 59.9 66.1 
1991 71.1 73.5 70.2 59.3 97.6 67.1 62.5 67.7 
1992 72.1 75.2 73.8 62.5 99.3 70 64.3 69.1 
1993 73.5 76.8 77.1 65.3 100.5 71.7 66.2 70 
1994 73.6 78.1 79.1 68 101.2 73.2 68 71.4 
1995 75.2 79.5 80.5 71.6 101.1 75.1 69.9 72.9 
1996 76.4 81.1 81.6 74.4 101.2 77 71.9 74.4 
1997 77.6 82 83.2 75.9 103 78.3 73.6 76 
1998 78.4 82.5 84 77.4 103.7 79.6 74.8 77.4 
1999 79.7 83 84.5 78.7 103.4 80.7 76.4 79.4 
2000 81.9 84.4 85.7 80.7 102.7 81.3 79 81.7 
2001 84 85.8 87.4 83 101.9 82.3 81.2 83.6 
2002 85.9 87.4 88.6 85 101 83.3 82.5 85.6 
2003 88.2 89.3 89.6 87.3 100.7 84.5 84.4 87.4 
2004 89.9 91.2 91 89.2 100.7 85.6 86.6 88.4 
2005 91.9 92.7 92.5 91 100.4 87.3 89.6 90 
2006 93.7 94.3 93.9 92.9 100.7 89.4 92.4 91.7 
2007 95.7 95.7 96.1 94.6 100.7 91.5 95.1 93.3 
2008 98 98.4 98.6 97.7 102.1 94.8 98.7 96.5 
2009 98.3 98.5 98.9 98.5 100.7 96.8 98.4 97.8 
2010 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 102.9 102.1 102.1 102.8 99.7 104.5 103.2 102.8 
2012 104.5 104.1 104.1 105.9 99.7 107.4 105.3 105.2 
2013 105.5 105 105.7 107.2 100 110.2 106.8 106.1 
2014 107.5 105.5 106.7 107.5 102.8 111.8 108.6 106.7 
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Prices and Purchasing Power Parities > Consumer and 
Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: Consumer 






Source: Table 5 recalculated to 1990 = 100%  
 







Table 6: Housing price indices 2010 = 100% (visualized in Figure 6) 
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 71 59.9 57.7 46 85.5 45.1 56.2 59.8 
1991 73.4 62.9 61.2 48.8 88.2 50.4 58.8 62.2 
1992 74.3 66 67.5 51.6 90.9 54.5 60.8 64.1 
1993 74.9 68.8 74.4 54.9 93.3 57.9 62.6 66 
1994 74.8 70.6 78.4 59 95.4 60.7 64.5 67.8 
1995 75.9 72.5 81.6 62.6 97.3 63.7 66.6 69.2 
1996 75.8 74.3 84.1 66.9 98.7 66.6 68.8 70.4 
1997 75.5 75.4 86.1 70.5 100.2 69.2 70.9 72.3 
1998 75.9 76.9 87.1 73.6 100.8 71.6 73.2 73.8 
1999 76.7 77.9 87.9 75.8 100.7 73.7 75.3 75.7 
2000 78.3 77.3 88.9 77.6 100.9 76.1 77.8 77.8 
2001 80.2 78.1 90.1 79.3 101.1 78.6 80.7 79.9 
2002 81.7 80.2 91.3 81.2 101 80.7 83.7 81.9 
2003 83.8 82.4 92.3 83.5 100.9 82.1 85.7 84 
2004 85.7 84.9 93 85.8 100.7 83.9 88.1 86.3 
2005 87.8 87.9 93.9 87.9 100.6 86.5 90.3 88.3 
2006 90.9 90.9 95 90.1 100.6 88.9 93.5 90.1 
2007 94.6 93.9 96.3 92.4 100.4 92 96.9 92.2 
2008 98.2 96.2 97.6 95 100.6 95.5 99.4 94.5 
2009 99.3 98.3 98.8 98.1 100.4 97.9 100.4 97.3 
2010 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 101.4 101.4 101.3 102 99.8 103.3 101.3 103 
2012 102.5 103.5 102.6 104.3 99.5 105.9 103.5 105.7 
2013 103.3 105.2 104 105.7 99.1 108 105.9 108.1 
2014 105.1 106.8 105.5 105.8 99.1 109.2 108.9 110 
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Prices and Purchasing Power Parties > Consumer and 
Producer Price Indices > Consumer Prices > Consumer price indices > Customize > Selection > Subject: (a) 







Source: Table 6 recalculated to 1990 = 100%  
 




Table 7: Productivity indices 2010 = 100% (visualized in Figure 7) 
 Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 76.7 73.5 72.2 85.7 70.6 67.7 68.2 74.4 
1991 77.3 74.5 74.8 85.7 72.6 69 69.1 76.1 
1992 78.9 76.1 76.6 86.9 73.6 72.3 71.5 77.5 
1993 80.4 77.2 78.1 88.6 75.8 75 71.7 78.6 
1994 82.1 79.1 80.2 92.3 76.6 77 72.4 83.8 
1995 83.1 81.2 81.7 95 78.4 77.9 72.5 85.2 
1996 83 81.8 83.3 95.1 80.1 79.1 74.4 87.3 
1997 85 83.5 85.5 96.9 81.9 80.8 75.5 88 
1998 86.8 85.7 86.5 96.8 82.2 82 77.1 87.9 
1999 88.8 87.1 87.7 97.4 84.7 83.9 79.3 88.8 
2000 91.4 90.4 89.9 100.1 86.7 86.7 81.5 90.9 
2001 92.4 91.4 92.3 100.6 87.9 88.3 83.3 90.6 
2002 93.7 94.4 93.5 99.8 89.7 90.6 85.7 91.3 
2003 94.2 95.3 94.2 99.1 91.1 94.3 88.3 92.9 
2004 94.5 96 95.2 100.1 93.4 96.4 90.6 95.9 
2005 96.7 97.2 96.6 100.7 94.6 97 92.4 97.4 
2006 97.8 100 98.5 100.7 95.2 99.3 93.1 98.6 
2007 97.8 99.9 100 100.6 96.8 100.8 94 98.8 
2008 97.7 99.1 100.2 100 97 101 94.8 97.3 
2009 98.5 98.5 97.6 97.8 96.2 98.5 97.5 95.4 
2010 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 101.4 101.1 102.1 100.5 100 101.2 100.1 99.9 
2012 101.6 101.4 102.6 100.2 100.8 99.8 100.6 100.4 
2013 102.7 103.1 103.3 100.4 102.5 99.7 101.6 100.3 
2014 104.8 103.1 103.6 99.8 102.1 100 102 100.5 
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Productivity > Productivity and ULC – Annual, Total Economy 







Source: Table 7 recalculated to 1990 = 100%  
 





Table 8: Hourly earnings in manufacturing indices 2010 = 100% (visualized in Figures 8–9) 
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 64.8 56.8 59 51.2 85.4 43.1 57.9 48.9 
1991 69.5 59 62.6 56.2 88.3 46.5 59.8 51.1 
1992 71.9 61.1 65.9 59.3 89.3 49.6 61.3 52.8 
1993 73.6 62.4 69.3 61.8 89.4 51.8 62.8 54.1 
1994 74.9 63.6 71.9 63.7 91.3 54.5 64.7 55.7 
1995 75.9 65.2 74.5 66 94.3 56.9 66.3 57.8 
1996 78.2 66.9 77.1 68 96.6 59.4 68.5 60 
1997 78.7 68.7 78.3 70.6 99.4 61.8 70.6 62.3 
1998 80.3 70.1 79.7 72.5 98.2 64.6 72.3 65.1 
1999 81.4 71.9 81.9 74.1 97.3 67.3 74.4 67.8 
2000 83.5 75.4 84 75.6 99.3 70.4 77 70.2 
2001 83.9 78.7 85.3 77.1 99.2 73 79.3 73.2 
2002 85 81.3 86.8 79.2 98 75.6 82.2 76.1 
2003 88.6 83.5 88.9 81.2 100.5 78.5 84.6 79.3 
2004 91.4 85.7 90.7 83.6 102.2 82.2 86.8 81.8 
2005 93.8 88.2 91.6 85.8 103 85.2 89 84.8 
2006 93.7 90.7 92.4 88.7 104.3 88.5 90.3 87.5 
2007 98.7 93.2 93.6 91.2 103.9 92.1 92.8 91 
2008 100.4 96.2 96.2 94.3 104 94.8 95.4 94.8 
2009 95.3 98.2 97.9 97.3 95.9 95.9 98 97.5 
2010 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2011 103.2 102.4 102.5 102.4 102.1 101.4 101.7 102.3 
2012 106.1 105 105.5 104.9 101.4 103.2 102.5 104.1 
2013 106.1 107.1 108.1 107.1 101.3 105.7 103.7 105.8 
2014 107 108.8 111.1 109.7 103.1 107.8 105.1 107.2 
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Labour > Earnings > Hourly earnings (MEI) > Customize > 








Source: Table 8 recalculated to 1990 = 100%  
 






Table 9: Hourly earnings in manufacturing in USD and EUR in 2011 (visualized in Figure 9) 
Country Hourly earnings in manufacturing in 
2011, USD 
Hourly earnings in manufacturing in 
2011, EUR 
Canada 25.48 19.68 
France 21.70 16.76 
Germany 27.70 21.39 
Italy 20.43 15.78 
Japan 20.23 15.62 
United Kingdom 21.98 16.97 
United States 23.70 18.30 
Denmark 39.15 30.23 
Source: (Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor 19.12.2012) International Comparisons of Hourly 
Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2011, p. 10, Table 3, last column 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf; the USD–EUR conversion rate 0.77220 for 31.12.2011 is from 






Source: Author’s derivation from Tables 8 and 9 
 





   
 
Source: Author’s computations based on the variables previously defined, taking into account the 2011 
hourly earnings in manufacturing as given in (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 
19.12.2012) International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2011, p. 10, 
Table 3, last column http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf; and the USD–EUR rate 0.77220 on 
31.12.2011 as given by (OANDA 2015) http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. 
 
Figure 10: Actual pay in manufacturing (solid lines) and fair pay (dashed lines) understood 






Source: Author’s computations based on the variables previously defined, taking into account the 2011 
hourly earnings in manufacturing as given in (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 
19.12.2012) International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2011, p. 10, 
Table 3, last column http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf; and the USD–EUR rate 0.77220 on 
31.12.2011 as given by (OANDA 2015) http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. 
 
Figure 11: Actual pay in manufacturing (solid lines) and fair pay (dashed lines) understood 





Table 10a: Gini coefficients for market income before taxes and transfers (dashed lines in Figure 4)  
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
1990 0.403  0.429   0.49  0.396 
1991 0.423   0.402     
1992 0.429        
1993 0.43        
1994 0.432     0.507   
1995 0.43  0.459 0.467 0.403  0.477 0.417 
1996 0.439 0.473       
1997 0.439        
1998 0.446        
1999 0.438     0.506   
2000 0.44 0.49 0.471 0.475 0.432 0.512 0.476 0.416 
2001 0.442     0.503   
2002 0.441     0.499   
2003 0.439    0.443 0.502   
2004 0.443  0.499 0.512  0.5   
2005 0.436 0.485    0.503 0.486 0.416 
2006 0.436    0.462 0.503  0.415 
2007 0.436     0.504  0.414 
2008 0.438 0.483 0.494 0.491  0.508 0.486 0.405 
2009 0.444 0.493 0.493 0.496 0.488 0.519 0.499 0.408 
2010 0.447 0.505 0.492 0.507  0.523 0.499 0.429 
2011 0.438 0.512 0.506 0.502   0.508 0.431 





Table 10b: Gini coefficients for disposable income post taxes and transfers (solid lines in Figure 4)  
Years Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Denmark 
         
1990 0.287  0.256   0.355 0.349 0.226 
1991 0.294   0.279   0.346 0.222 
1992 0.292  0.263    0.352 0.222 
1993 0.286  0.262    0.369 0.223 
1994 0.287  0.268   0.337 0.366 0.216 
1995 0.289  0.266 0.327 0.323  0.361 0.215 
1996 0.297 0.277 0.26    0.363 0.216 
1997 0.301 0.278 0.259    0.364 0.224 
1998 0.307 0.276 0.259    0.357 0.224 
1999 0.307 0.284 0.259   0.34 0.354 0.228 
2000 0.315 0.287 0.264 0.323 0.337 0.352 0.357 0.227 
2001 0.317 0.287 0.27   0.34 0.36  
2002 0.318 0.284 0.28   0.335 0.376  
2003 0.316 0.282 0.282  0.321 0.335 0.374  
2004 0.322 0.283 0.285 0.331  0.331 0.36  
2005 0.317 0.288 0.297   0.335 0.38 0.232 
2006 0.317 0.293 0.29  0.329 0.339 0.384 0.239 
2007 0.318 0.292 0.295   0.341 0.376 0.246 
2008 0.321 0.293 0.287 0.317  0.342 0.378 0.242 
2009 0.32 0.293 0.288 0.315 0.336 0.345 0.379 0.238 
2010 0.319 0.303 0.286 0.321  0.341 0.38 0.252 
2011 0.316 0.309 0.293 0.322   0.389 0.253 
2012    0.326   0.389  
Source: OECD.Stat http://stats.oecd.org/ (26.11.2015) > Social protection and well-being > Income distribution and 
poverty > Customize > Selection > Age group: total population; Definition: current definition; Methodology: income 
definition until 2011; Measure: (a) Gini (market income, before taxes and transfers); (b) Gini (disposable income, post 
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